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"SOME EXCEPTIONAL
CONDITION"-THE ANATOMY OF A
DECISION UNDER FEDERAL RULE OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE 53(b)
PATRICIA M. WALD*
For fifty years the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have made
judges' lives easier by providing clear and reasonably precise stan-
dards for procedural decision making. The Rules have withstood
the test of time remarkably well, accommodating with only modest
revisions new problems, new types of cases, and new conditions in
our courts. There remain, however, some rules which by their na-
ture require continual reinterpretation in light of novel or newly
emergent legal issues.
This is an account of the way the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit recently went about deciding such an
issue: specifically, whether mandamus should issue to prevent a
district judge from appointing a special master, pursuant to federal
rule 53(b), to help sort out an unusual Freedom of Information Act
claim. The majority and dissenting opinions issued by the court,
which by a 2-1 margin found that appointment of such a master
was authorized, not only shed light on the nuances of a relatively
obscure procedural rule; they also illustrate the ways in which the
history of the Federal Rules, judicial precedent, the bare language
of the Rules, and even constitutional notions of appropriate article
III behavior have helped to shape, and no doubt will continue to
shape, the application of the Rules to an evolving and unpredict-
able jurisprudential scene.
I.
Federal rule 53(b) authorizes the appointment of, and sets
terms of compensation for, special masters in civil litigation. The
heart of the rule is its second subsection, which, in pertinent part,
states:
* Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
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A reference to a master shall be the exception and not the rule. In
actions to be tried by a jury, a reference shall be made only when
the issues are complicated; in actions to be tried without a jury,
save in matters of account and of difficult computation of dam-
ages, a reference shall be made only upon a showing that some
exceptional condition requires it.'
What is striking about rule 53(b) is its spareness. By itself, the
rule tells us next to nothing about what qualifies as an "excep-
tional condition." One might conclude that a case need only be
somehow different from the garden variety-more "complicated"
or time-consuming, perhaps. If a "difficult computation of dam-
ages" justifies a master, why should not some other difficult feature
of the case qualify as an "exceptional condition" as well? Perhaps
the condition could lie with the judge herself: a temporarily con-
gested calendar, or an unusually busy year. There is, in short, in
rule 53's open-ended terminology "abundant, if not infinite, flexi-
bility and room for interpretation."2 As the complexity of federal
cases grows, filings increase, and judicial time and resources be-
come ever more precious, almost every "big" or "tough" case could
end up with the appointment of a master. This result would surely
have its advantages: judges, free to delegate discrete chores to
magistrates3 and masters, could manage their own calendars and
cases better. Also, since rule 53(a) provides for charging the parties
(not the taxpayers) with the costs of the master, it amounts to a
currently fashionable users' fee that places the financial burden of
litigation on those who benefit directly from the courts' services.
Although such an interpretation of rule 53's broad language
FED. R. Civ. P. 53 (b).
2 Brakel, Special Masters in Institutional Litigation, 1979 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 543,
550.
8 United States magistrates are full-time judicial officers of the district court who serve
at the government's expense. "A judge may designate a magistrate to serve as a special
master in any civil case, upon consent of the parties, without regard to the provisions of
rule 53(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(2) (1982) (em-
phasis added).
In 1983, rule 53 was amended to conform with section 636(b)(2). Rule 53(b) now ex-
empts magistrates, appointed with the parties' consent, from the general requirement "that
some exceptional condition" requires the reference. For cases and commentary to the effect
that there need not be the same restrictions on the use of magistrates as outside masters,
see CAB v. Carefree Travel, Inc., 513 F.2d 375, 379-80 (2d Cir. 1975); McCabe, The Federal
Magistrate Act of 1979, 16 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 343, 373 (1979) ("Many of the inherent de-
fects of the master system. . . are alleviated considerably when a United States magistrate
• ..serves as a master in a civil case."); Silberman, Masters and Magistrates Part 11: The
American Analogue, 50 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1297, 1327-29 (1975).
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would be reasonable, and perhaps even desirable, it would also be
wrong, for as we shall see, there is much more to rule 53 than its
bare words. The rule's origins and history, as well as a body of
precedent interpreting it and a body of commentary worrying
about its overuse, cumulatively inform everyday decisions about its
application. The case study of In re United States Department of
Defense4 provides a useful example.
II.
The Department of Defense decision arose from a lawsuit filed
under the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") 5 by Washington
Post staff writer R. Scott Armstrong. Armstrong requested that the
Department of Defense ("DOD") produce approximately 2,000
documents relating to the United States' attempts in 1980 to res-
cue its hostages in Iran. The documents comprised approximately
14,000 pages. DOD withheld them, citing FOIA's exemption for
classified national security documents.' DOD claimed the informa-
tion in the withheld documents was highly sensitive.
The trial judge announced that he was considering appointing
a special master to review the documents DOD had withheld. Arm-
strong endorsed the idea, but DOD did not. Instead, it submitted
to the trial judge a classified document index, providing descrip-
tions and justifications for withholding each document, and pro-
posed that the trial judge review a random sample of the withheld
documents, based upon which he could judge in camera the appli-
cability of the claimed exemptions.
The judge, however, adhered to his proposal for a special
4 848 F.2d 232 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
- 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
' See id. § 552(b)(1).
7 Department of Defense, 848 F.2d at 233.
According to an affidavit submitted to the district court by the major general in
charge of reviewing FOIA requests lodged with DOD on special operations mat-
ters, the documents at issue "contain the actual working files for the planning and
review of the rescue mission of 24 April 1980, as well as the following intelligence
efforts to determine the location of the hostages and monitor the political efforts
to obtain their release." The documents include "handwritten notes, intelligence
messages, draft option papers, and the military plans for the mission." As such,
they contain information that "provides a detailed description of the training,
planning, operational concepts, weapons systems, and communications systems
employed in the preparation, and execution of the rescue mission."
Id. at 233 n.2 (citation omitted) (quoting Declaration by Maj. Gen. W.H. Rice (Oct. 19,
1985)).
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master. In a notice to counsel, he explained that he was dissatisfied
with alternative means of initial document review. Obtaining se-
curity clearances that would allow the judge's law clerks and other
staff to provide assistance in reviewing the mass of documents, he
stated, would be difficult and time-consuming. Nor did he consider
a government-prepared sample index to be an acceptable solution,
citing case authority questioning the impartiality of government-
run sampling. Finally, the judge stated, mere random sampling-in
which the judge would sift a random sample of the docu-
ments-was not "particularly appropriate for the circumstances
here."8
The judge's solution was to appoint a security-cleared intelli-
gence expert as master and to charge him with developing a repre-
sentative sample of the withheld documents and summarizing to
the court the arguments that each party had made, or could have
made, with respect to the exemptions claimed by DOD. Under this
arrangement, the judge wrote:
The Court's Article III role would be preserved, and indeed en-
hanced beyond that performed by the Court in an in camera re-
view: adjudication of the exemptions claimed would be based on
the samples selected, an appraisal of the method used by the spe-
cial master to select the samples, and consideration of the argu-
ments pro and con summarized for the Court by the master to-
gether with any additional arguments suggested by the parties.
The master will make no recommendation.9
Four weeks later, DOD filed a petition in the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit, seeking a writ of mandamus to
revoke the appointment.
III.
DOD's petition forced the three-judge panel of our circuit to
confront a novel question of interpretation arising under rule
53(b). In suggesting that the district judge had so abused his dis-
cretion as to warrant the extraordinary remedy of mandamus re-
lief,10 DOD was arguing that no legal basis existed to support ap-
8 Id. at 234.
9Id.
"0 See Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 108 S. Ct. 1133, 1143 (1988).
"[T]he writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, to be reserved for extraordinary situ-
ations." Id. The Supreme Court has offered several reasons for limiting the invocation of
mandamus to "the exceptional case where there is clear abuse of discretion or 'usurpation of
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pointment of a master-that, in short, no "exceptional condition"
existed as was required by rule 53(b). At least three viable trial-
management techniques existed which the trial judge had spurned:
use of the random selection techniques initially urged by DOD; use
of the descriptive index of documents prepared by DOD to select
representative documents upon which the judge could assess the
applicability of the claimed exemptions; and use of the judge's law
clerks, who, after having received security clearances, could sift the
documents in question. Whatever the relative merits of these tech-
niques, DOD argued, the presence of practical, albeit imperfect, al-
ternatives to the appointment of a master meant that no "excep-
tional condition" existed to justify reference to such an outside
party.
DOD's argument was hardly frivolous. As I have noted, the
term "exceptional condition" is less than self-defining. What is in-
triguing, and illustrative of the rich texture of legal authority that
has accreted around the Federal Rules in their bare half-century of
existence, are the numerous and different sources of legal authority
judicial power.'" La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 257 (1957) (quoting Bankers
Life & Casualty Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 383 (1953)). First, mandamus actions "'have
the unfortunate consequence of making the [district court] judge a litigant,'" Kerr v.
United States District Court, 426 U.S. 394, 402 (1976) (quoting Bankers Life, 346 U.S. at
384-85); second, "particularly in an era of excessively crowded. . . dockets, it is in the inter-
est of the fair and prompt administration of justice to discourage piecemeal litigation," id.
at 403; third, Congress, since the Judiciary Act of 1789, has signaled its desire that appellate
review be postponed until a trial court has rendered a final judgment. Issuing a "writ of
mandamus in anything less than an extraordinary situation would run the real risk of de-
feating" the policies Congress sought to further. Id.
Explaining his decision not to request an en bane hearing of the Department of De-
fense case, Judge Starr wrote:
Upon reflection ... I have come to the view that, in its present posture, this
matter is less than well suited for en bane consideration. The reason is that, as the
case comes to us, the Government is seeking a petition for mandamus to prevent
the District Court from going forward with its proposed appointment of a special
master. The Rule 53 question is therefore presented to us with, as it were, a proce-
dural overlay in the form of the standards which are deemed applicable in a man-
damus inquiry....
It is for this procedural reason alone that I forebear from calling on the court
to consider this case for en bane treatment. And that fact reinforces one stark
reality which should not be lost on the bench and bar-the sole result of the
panel's exercise is to deny a petition for a writ of mandamus. Should the Rule 53
question arise hereafter in a proper appeal, the propriety of invoking the proce-
dures under circumstances such as those that obtain here remains, in my view,
entirely open and unresolved. In a word, the yellow light is still flashing.
In re United States Dep't of Defense, No. 84-5044 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 31, 1988) (separate state-
ment of Starr, J.), denying rehearing to 848 F.2d 232 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
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upon which the panel majority (for which I wrote) and the panel
dissent (which my colleague Judge Starr wrote) drew in reaching
their contrary results.
The panel majority relied heavily upon the history of rule 53,
especially as it had been applied since 1938. Apparent to us at the
outset was the "mood" of rule 53, which, while providing authori-
zation for the appointment of masters in some situations, was
clearly meant to discourage widespread reliance on them. The
rule-especially its language of exceptions and exceptional condi-
tions-has its roots in "equity rule 59," adopted in 1912 as part of
a series of reforms designed to dismantle a burdensome and expen-
sive equity system under which it was believed judges had dele-
gated too much of their responsibility to masters.1' Typical of the
continuing complaints about reference to masters even after 1912,
we learned, was Chancellor Vanderbilt's:
There is one special cause of delay in getting cases on for trial
that must be singled out for particular condemnation, the all too
prevalent habit of sending matters to a reference. There is no
more effective way of putting a case to sleep for an indefinite pe-
riod than to permit it to go to a reference with a busy lawyer as a
referee. 12
Largely as a result of this lineage, rule 53 is generally viewed
as encoding what one commentator terms "a general disinclination
to view a non-jury reference with favor."' 3 Such references to mas-
ters, it is widely believed, "remove the courts from the arena of
litigation, burden the parties with added costs, may unduly delay
the outcome, and cause a large duplication of effort inasmuch as
the court must, upon objection to the master's report, review the
record and his findings before adopting them as its own." 4 The
framers of rule 53 were particularly worried about judicial abdica-
tion of the core function of running trials, and about the practice
in some courts of routinely delegating to masters certain types of
unusually difficult cases, such as antitrust and patent litigation. 5
11 See Brazil, Referring Discovery Tasks to Special Masters: Is Rule 53 a Source of
Authority and Restrictions?, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 143, 153; Kaufman, Masters in the
Federal Courts: Rule 53, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 454 n.12 (1958).
12 A. VANDERBILT, MODERN PROCEDURE AND JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 1240-41 (1952),
quoted in Kaufman, supra note 11, at 453 n.7.
11 Id. at 456.
14 Id.
15 See Note, Reference of the Big Case under Federal Rule 53(b): A New Meaning for
[Vol. 62:405
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Supreme Court precedent reflects a parallel concern that, un-
less cautiously used, masters can effectively usurp the judicial
function of deciding cases. A long line of precedent, before and es-
pecially after the adoption of rule 53, emphasizes that masters ex-
ist to assist, but not to supplant, the trial judge.16 As early as 1889,
Justice Field, in Kimberly v. Arms,17 endorsed the use of masters
to aid the judge at trial, but cautioned that the judge must never
relinquish ultimate decisional powers:
A master in chancery is an officer appointed by the court to assist
it in various proceedings incidental to the progress of a cause
before it, and is usually employed to take and state accounts, to
take and report testimony, and to perform such duties as require
computation of interest, the value of annuities, the amount of
damages in particular cases, the auditing ad ascertaining of liens
upon property involved, and similar services. The information
which he may communicate by his findings in such cases, upon
the evidence presented to him, is merely advisory to the court,
which it may accept and act upon or disregard in whole or in part,
according to its own judgment as to the weight of the evidence
.... [The court] cannot, of its own motion, or upon the request
of one party, abdicate its duty to determine by its own judgment
the controversy presented, and devolve that duty upon any of its
officers.18
In 1920, the Supreme Court repeated its admonition that mas-
ters are "to aid judges in the performance of specific judicial du-
the "Exceptional Condition" Standard, 65 YALE L.J. 1057, 1057-58 (1956).
"I Well before the enactment of rule 53, it was established that federal courts have "an
inherent authority to appoint masters as a natural concomitant of their judicial power."
Kaufman, supra note 11, at 462. Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300 (1920), is the seminal
decision in this regard. The Supreme Court stated in Peterson that courts "have ... inher-
ent power to provide themselves with appropriate instruments required for the performance
of their duties. This power includes authority to appoint persons unconnected with the
court to aid judges in the performance of specific judicial duties, as they may arise in the
progress of a cause." Id. at 312 (citation omitted). Federal courts have relied on inherent
authority-and, since 1938, on rule 53-to delegate to masters pretrial fact-finding func-
tions; trial-stage matters; and, in recent years, post-trial implementation functions. See Bra-
zil, supra note 11, at 176-77. Different questions and concerns are raised depending on the
purpose and the timing of the master's appointment. Id. passim (arguing that rule 53 was
not designed to permit courts to use masters during the pretrial discovery stage); see Brakel,
supra note 2, at 562-63 (discussing potential problems with using special masters in institu-
tional-e.g., prison or mental hospital-cases to perform post-decree implementation
functions).
.7 129 U.S. 512 (1889).
,1 Id. at 523-24.
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ties," and not to displace the court. 9 In so doing, the Court af-
firmed the inherent power of courts to appoint special masters to
perform a variety of "specific judicial duties," but the list of func-
tions it offered by way of example were generally limited ones that
left ultimate decisional powers with the trial judge: "To take and
report testimony; to audit and state accounts; to make computa-
tions; to determine, where the facts are complicated and the evi-
dence voluminous, what questions are actually in issue; to hear
conflicting evidence and make finding thereon .... "'0
Finally, in 1957, in the seminal case of La Buy v. Howes
Leather Co.,21 the Supreme Court laid down one clear limitation
on the use of rule 53: referring an entire case to a master on the
ground that the court was overburdened was inappropriate. Such a
referral "amounted to little less than an abdication of the judicial
function depriving the parties of a trial before the court."22 In La
Buy, the Supreme Court overturned a district judge's wholesale
reference to a master of two full civil antitrust trials. The Court
rejected the district judge's arguments that calendar congestion
constituted an "exceptional circumstance," and emphasized that
the use of masters is "'to aid judges in the performance of specific
judicial duties, as they may arise in the progress of a cause,' and
not to displace the court."23 As for the concern expressed by the
trial judge that the issues posed by the cases were complicated, the
Court stated that complexity "is an impelling reason for the trial
before a regular, experienced trial judge rather than before a tem-
porary substitute appointed on an ad hoc basis and ordinarily not
experienced in judicial work."24
From this precedent, as well as from the historic concern
about judicial abdication underlying rule 53, the panel majority in
Department of Defense took as its starting point the assumption
that the precise nature of the duties delegated to the master is all-
important under rule 53. As one commentator has stated, "[w]here
the function delegated to the master is basically ministerial there
is little if any abdication of the judicial function, and such matters,
rather than tying up the court, can in many instances be more
19 Peterson, 253 U.S. at 312.
20 Id. at 313.
21 352 U.S. 249 (1957).
22 Id. at 256.
2 Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312 (1920)).
2' La Buy, 352 U.S. at 259.
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profitably referred to a master. ' 25 However, Department of De-
fense did not, at first blush, fit squarely into either the category of
cases in which a master has been delegated ultimate decisional du-
ties, or the category of plainly ancillary chores. 26 On the one hand,
the trial judge had charged the master with duties central to the
resolution of the case-in-chief-sorting the FOIA documents and
enumerating potential arguments. On the other hand, the judge in
calling upon the master to develop a representative sample ex-
pressly forbade the master from making any recommendations,
and not only retained ultimate decisional power but allowed the
parties to challenge the master's actions.
Nor did the smattering of FOIA cases in our circuit set clear
parameters for the appointment of masters. True, fifteen years ear-
lier we had stated in dicta that designatink masters in FOIA cases
was appropriate. But in that case, Vaughn v. Rosen,27 the court
had offered little guidance on either the types of FOIA cases in
which masters could appropriately be used, or on what types of
activities masters could perform. Rather, we wrote simply that
where a trial judge determines that dealing with "the raw material
of an FOIA lawsuit may still be extremely burdensome . . . it is
within the discretion of [the] trial court to designate a special
master to examine documents and evaluate an agency's contention
of exemption."28 The "special master would not act as an advo-
cate" but instead would "assist the adversary process by assuming
much of the burden of examining and evaluating voluminous docu-
ments that currently falls on the trial judge."29 However, even had
Vaughn purported to establish binding precedent authorizing
25 Kaufman, supra note 11, at 457.
26 Special masters have been used in multifarious contexts. See, e.g., California v.
Texas, 459 U.S. 963, 963 (1982) (ordering appointment of master to supervise pleadings and
issuing of subpoenas); Mississippi v. Arkansas, 402 U.S. 926, 926-27 (1971) (special master
used to determine facts in a water rights dispute); Los Angeles Brush Mfg. Corp. v. James,
272 U.S. 701, 702-03, 708 (1927) (upholding reference of patent infringement cases to
master); In re Hotel Governor Clinton, Inc., 107 F.2d 398, 399 (2d Cir. 1939) (upholding use
of master in bankruptcy reorganization proceedings); Biechele v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 309 F.
Supp. 354, 359 (N.D. Ohio 1969) (various nuisance claims referred to master in plaintiffs'
class action suit for determination of damages); Kapral v. Jepson, 271 F. Supp. 74, 84 (D.
Conn. 1967) (special master appointed to formulate plan for redistricting); Heiberg v. Has-
ler, 1 F.R.D. 735, 737 (E.D.N.Y. 1941) (determination of foreign law referred to special
master to take testimony and report).
.7 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974).
25 Id. at 828.
29 Id.
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broad invocation of masters, our subsequent decision in Meeropol
v. Meese"' had qualified our endorsement. Meeropol held that a
trial court had not erred in deciding not to appoint a special
master in a FOIA cases, emphasizing the manifest discretion ac-
corded trial judges in making such decisions. Meeropol, however,
also stated in language pertinent to the issue now confronting us in
Department of Defense that:
[Tlhe appointment of a special master will often present more
problems than it will solve. If the master makes significant deci-
sions without careful review by the trial judge, judicial authority
is effectively delegated to [a non-article III official]; if the trialjudge carefully reviews each decision made by the master, it is
doubtful that judicial time or resources will have been conserved
to any significant degree. 1
What ultimately persuaded the panel majority that the FOIA
appointment in Department of Defense was in harmony with the
spirit and the historical application of rule 53 were the strict limi-
tations the district judge imposed upon the master's authority.
The judge, we wrote, "carefully cabined the master's authority,"
and he "expressly forbade the master from making any recommen-
dations, charging him instead with the more limited task of devel-
oping a representative sample and summarizing each party's argu-
ments or potential arguments. ' 32 The judge also promised the
parties that they would have the opportunity to challenge before
him the conclusions reached in the master's report. In this respect,
Department of Defense diverged dramatically from La Buy, where
ultimate decisional authority in two full cases was delegated to a
master, and from the handful of appellate cases either criticizing or
overturning the appointments of a master by the lower court. In
each of those cases, the flaw in the master's reference was in the
grant of final authority-unreviewable by even the judge-over
merits issues. These cases involved irretrievable delegations of au-
thority to masters to decide dispositive pretrial motions,33 to de-
cide an entire land-contract case,34 and to preside over the merits
of a complex environmental lawsuit.35 In one case, reference to a
30 790 F.2d 942 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
31 Id. at 961.
32 Department of Defense, 848 F.2d at 236.
" See In re United States, 816 F.2d 1083, 1089 (6th Cir. 1987).
See Bennerson v. Joseph, 583 F.2d 633, 641-42 (3d Cir. 1978).
See In re Armco, Inc., 770 F.2d 103, 105 (8th Cir. 1985).
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master was criticized where it was shown that the judge had
adopted every word of a master's opinion on a summary judgment
motion without making any changes of his own!3 6
Also striking to the panel was how similar the job assigned to
the Department of Defense master was to the masters' roles in
overseeing complex pretrial discovery regimes in a series of cases in
which courts had found the requisite "exceptional condition." We
wrote:
The burden of sorting and categorizing sheafs of documents to
facilitate testing them for compliance with FOIA's exceptions is a
close cousin to the task of overseeing complex document produc-
tion, an instance of the "unusual discovery" that has been widely
recognized as constituting an exceptional condition within the
ambit of Rule 53(b)."
Like discovery oversight, the role of FOIA document-sorting over-
sight seemed infected with none of the problems of excessive dele-
gation or unnecessary cost that animate rule 53's lukewarm atti-
tude towards masters.
The interpretative analysis adopted by the majority for perus-
ing and applying this somewhat elliptical federal rule was, thus,
very much a functional one, focusing on the practical needs of the
judge and the workings of the master arrangement in this case, and
contrasting the limited reference here with the broader evils
against which rule 53 was designed to guard. We concluded:
In our view, this case features a very special set of circum-
stances which meet the "exceptional condition" test of Rule 53. It
involves a FOIA claim with respect to which the judge has no ac-
cess to impartial expert witnesses or other features of the adver-
sary process in order to assist him in making his decision about
disclosure. It also involves a massive collection of 14,000 pages
which must be sifted through. As Judge Oberdorfer's response to
the mandamus petition pointed out, he had only recently used his
law clerks for several months to assist him in a "much less techni-
cal and sensitive FOIA case," and presumably would have done so
again, except for the fact that to do so in this case would have
required that they obtain special security clearances, a time-con-
suming process in itself. The judge also made a judgment based
upon several years of experience on the case that random sam-
" See Jack Walters & Sons Corp. v. Morton Bldg., Inc., 737 F.2d 698, 712-13 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1018 (1984).
37 Department of Defense, 848 F.2d at 235 n.5.
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pling would not be an appropriate technique in this instance. He
therefore resorted to appointment of a master to ensure a
prompt, thorough, and independent look at all the documents.
Apart from our assumption that Rule 53 itself clearly envisions
considerable discretion in the district court in deciding when an
"exceptional condition" exists, we find the special combination of
circumstances here fits well within that term."8
Thus, the panel majority settled upon an essentially prag-
matic, ad hoc standard for deciding when an "exceptional condi-
tion" exists: here it was sufficient that the trial judge was con-
fronted with a massive number of documents dealing with
sensitive, specialized subject matter and could get no immediate
help from his chamber's staff. He needed a security-cleared expert
fast, if the trial was to move ahead.
IV.
The dissenting judge, however, drew less upon the animating
history and precedential application of rule 53 to determine
whether an "exceptional condition" existed. His was instead pri-
marily a linguistic argument, focusing upon one word in rule 53(b):
the word "requires." Contending that the exceptional condition
must not only warrant or justify the appointment of the special
master, it must require it, Judge Starr wrote:
It is, in all candor, difficult for me to see how an appoint-
ment, however distinguished the proposed master may be, is "re-
quired" when other "non-master" routes are so readily available.
It is undisputed that the judicially approved method of random
sampling is available and as yet unemployed. Likewise available
is an in camera Vaughn index and affidavit .... Under these
circumstances, it would seem almost by definition that an ap-
pointment cannot be "required" if other vehicles or avenues are
at hand. To so hold has the obvious and untoward effect of drain-
ing Rule 53's language of its natural meaning. That language, lest
there be any mistake, sounds not in broad, sweeping terms of ju-
dicial discretion. Rather, Rule 53 commands a showing that some
exceptional condition requires the appointment.
Here, it is by no means evident that a master's appointment
is "required" by an "exceptional condition" within the meaning
of Rule 53, nor are any reasons evident in the record that would
11 Id. at 236 (citation omitted); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 53 advisory committee's note
("such masters may prove useful when some special expertise is desired").
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warrant such an appointment. The "exceptional conditions" re-
ferred to by the trial court include the burden presented by the
necessity of in camera review of voluminous, highly sensitive doc-
uments, particularly in light of the difficulty of obtaining security
clearances for judicial clerks and staff. But these factors cannot
constitute "exceptional conditions" requiring the appointment of
a special master unless the court can point to some reason why
other, judicially-sanctioned methods of dealing with these com-
mon FOIA problems will not suffice. This the District Court, with
all respect, has failed to do. 9
In sum, our dissenting colleague would require a showing that
no other technique besides reference to a master would suffice:
Although it is not for us to direct in minute detail how the trial
court should perform what is indisputably its task, we should not
be quick to sanction an extraordinary remedy when the District
Court has yet to explain why other avenues, which have in the
past enabled it adequately to fulfill its task, are unavailing. Surely
convenience alone does not suffice as an explanation, for if it did
masters would be the rule in all FOIA cases of any size.
The use in rule 53 of the word "require," we can safely as-
sume, was no accident. To hold that trial judges have no obliga-
tion to explain why other courses of action, short of appointing a
master, will not suffice thus empties the Rule of any content. At
the very least, the trial judge must explain why a master is "re-
quired," i.e., necessary or essential. If Rule 53 really means "de-
sire" rather than "require," then today's result follows. But as a
matter of logic (and if the Rule means what it says), before a
master is required, other ordinary courses must necessarily be in-
efficacious. In this case, there were at least two judicially ap-
proved alternative courses to follow short of appointing a special
master. In my view, the District Judge is obliged to explain the
reasons why those previously approved methods would not work
under the particular circumstances of this case. Only then could
we truly say that an exceptional condition had required the Dis-
trict Judge to appoint a special master.40
To the panel majority, this argument misconceived the import
of rule 53, which no court had previously held to require the labo-
rious showing the dissent urged.4 1 The majority noted that the trial
" Department of Defense, 848 F.2d at 240-41 (Starr, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
40 Id. at 241-42 (Starr, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
41 Justice Brandeis' opinion in Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300 (1920), made clear that
for appointment of a master to be appropriate, it is not necessary that the master's contri-
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judge had considered, but rejected, the alternative techniques
urged by the government: random selection, for example, or the
selection by the government of a "representative" sample. We be-
lieved the trial judge's intense familiarity with the case bolstered
his authority to make such a choice, and "reaffirm[ed] the broad
discretion over trial-management tactics with which a district
judge is vested": 42
Having found serious flaws in these alternatives, he was well
within his discretion to conclude that Rule 53 required recourse
to a master. In urging deployment of a mandamus writ against
Judge Oberdorfer, Judge Starr would have us conclude that the
trial judge-after four years' experience on this case, and armed
with instructive experience on other FOIA litigation to which he
alluded in recounting his decision to appoint the master-abused
his discretion in adjudging this trial-management technique more
effective than others. Nothing in Rule 53, or in the daunting stan-
dards governing mandamus, supports such manifest appellate
court interference with Judge Oberdorfer's trial management..
We accordingly upheld the reference to the master.
CONCLUSION
This brief exercise in the anatomy of one particular judicial
application of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53(b) illustrates, I
hope, that after fifty years the Rules remain living documents.
Courts interpreting the Federal Rules are not locked into proce-
dural straitjackets designed solely to prevent the recurrence of an-
tiquated problems. Rather, they can and do look for wisdom and
guidance not just in the bare language of the Rules (though as my
colleague's dissenting opinion in Department of Defense shows,
the language of the Rules is often more rich in meaning than im-
mediately meets the eye), but also to the Rules' origins, history,
precedential application, and guiding purpose. New problems are
bution be literally "necessary" to do justice; rather, the master need only be "necessary" to
maximize the efficiency of the litigation process. See id. at 312-14. In one commentator's
words, Justice Brandeis concluded that the master in Peterson was "required" only in the
sense that he was necessary "to make the litigation process as expeditious and orderly as
possible. And, since it is not possible to determine in advance which procedures or forms of
assistance are literally 'necessary' to maximize efficiency, Brandeis' approach converts the
meaning of terms like 'necessary' and 'essential' into 'very useful.'" Brazil, supra note 11, at
184.
42 Department of Defense, 848 F.2d at 238.
" Id. at 238-39.
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always arising, and the judicial gloss on many of the Rules, while
by now a thick one, does not always offer decisive guidance. Yet, in
providing the analytic tools with which judges of the present and
future can sort out procedural conundrums, without locking jurists
into undesired or anachronistic practices or frameworks, the Rules
have succeeded mightily in facilitating the development of the law
during an extraordinary half-century of change. Let us wish them
another fifty years of comparable success.

